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Recent studies of visual perception are bringing us
closer to an understanding of what we remember — and
what we forget — when we recall a scene.
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How good is your memory? One line of research starting
about 30 years ago shows that your memory for visually
presented material is quite remarkably good [1,2]. In a
typical picture recognition study, subjects are shown a
number of scenes — such as images cut from a glossy
travel magazine — each of which is presented for a second
or two. In the test phase, subjects are shown a second set
of scenes, half of them from the first set and the other half
presented for the first time. The task is to identify
members of the second set as old or new. Subjects
perform very well on such a task, even when thousands of
pictures are shown [3,4].
What are the subjects of such a study remembering?
Common sense tells us that our memory for a picture is
not some sort of highly detailed neural photocopy. Indeed,
the details of the image are not well remembered [5].
Imagine trying to distinguish new from old from among a
thousand different pictures of the stacks in the university
library. A flurry of recent research has shown how bad we
are at recognizing differences between similar scenes or
changes between two versions of the same scene, a phe-
nomenon that has been referred to as ‘change blindness’
[6,7]. Subjects might be shown a picture of an airplane on
a runway, and in the second view the engines would be
removed from the plane. The two images, one with and
the other without engines, alternate on the screen every
few seconds, with a blank screen presented in between to
mask luminance transients. It can take a surprisingly long
time to notice this change. Subjects also fail to notice
changes made during an eye movement [8–10]. This is
exploited in movies, where cuts between views render
subjects insensitive to changes in clothing, props or even
the identity of actors [11].
How can we reconcile excellent performance on picture
recognition with dismal performance on change detection?
One possibility is that observers do not remember the
scene per se. Rather, they remember the gist of the scene.
Thus, in picture recognition, where all the pictures are
quite different, subjects can say to themselves, “Ah yes, I
have seen a picture of a burning house; no, I didn’t see a
picture of a cat in the bathtub”. By this account, change
blindness occurs because the change does not alter the
gist. A conversation between two women remains a con-
versation between two women, even if the clothing or the
props change. In support of this idea, there is strong evi-
dence that the meaning of a scene can influence memory
for that scene. For instance, Brewer and Treyans [12] had
subjects wait in an office, and then questioned them about
the contents of the office. Subjects routinely reported
books in the office, not because books were present —
they were not — but because books are part of the
schema for what should be in an office. People routinely
remember seeing more of a scene than was presented
[13,14]. On a more sinister note, memory for scenes can be
colored by the biases of the observer [15].
The difficulty with the appealing idea that we remember
the gist of a scene is that there is no consensus about the
contents of a ‘gist’. Intuition suggests that an inventory of
some of the objects in the scene should be at least a part of
the gist. If you asked someone to describe a scene, you
would be surprised if the description named no objects
but relied only on a description of features, such as color or
size. A recent experiment by Luck and Vogel [16] seems
to show this coding into memory for objects, rather than
simple features. They performed a variation of a change-
detection experiment. Two arrays of items were presented
to subjects; on half the trials, the second array contained
one item that was changed. If one-to-three colored squares
were presented, subjects could perfectly detect the
change; performance fell off with larger set sizes. These
results suggest that subjects can keep track of four colors.
Now, suppose that each item on the screen could vary in
color, orientation, size and the presence or absence of a
gap. Would subjects be able to keep track of just four indi-
vidual features, or would they be able to keep track of up
to four objects with all of their associated features? The
answer, in a variety of versions of this experiment, is that
subjects kept track of objects. They could detect any
single feature change in any of up to four objects, even
though that meant keeping track of more than a dozen
individual features.
There is a bottleneck between vision and memory. If you
close your eyes, you will immediately lose access to many
of the details that were obvious a moment ago. The results
of Luck and Vogel [16] show that it is objects and not raw
features, that move through that bottleneck. The selection
of objects is governed by attention. There is copious
evidence that it is easier to attend to properties belonging
to one object than to spatially equivalent properties spread
over two or more objects [17–19].
Where does this leave us in the search for the gist of a
picture? Evidence from visual search experiments sug-
gests that objects can be identified at a rate of at least 20
per second [20]. It is possible that the rate of transfer into
any sort of stable memory runs at the slower rates seen in
‘rapid serial visual presentation’ experiments (see [21], for
example). In either case, a relatively brief presentation of
a scene would allow several objects to be identified and
passed to memory. Is that list the gist? One could imagine
that a list of N objects would be sufficient to categorize a
scene, but a series of thought experiments tells us that a
gist is more than a list. Some relationships between
objects must be coded into the gist [5]. A picture of milk
being poured from a carton into a glass is not the same as a
picture of milk being poured from a carton into the space
next to a glass, even if all of the objects are the same.
Moreover, even if all the propositional relationships
between objects remain the same, some information about
the spatial layout must be incorporated into the gist: con-
sider, for example, the fact that subjects can be quite good
at telling if an image has been left–right reversed in the
test phase of a picture recognition experiment [22].
Beyond object relations and spatial layout, the gist seems
to contain information about the presence of as yet
unidentified objects. Imagine a scene of a toy drawer
jumbled with toys. Only a few toys might be identified,
but the gist would surely include the fact that there were a
lot of other objects that could be identified, given time.
Finally, at the most basic level, the gist would seem to
include impression of the low-level visual features that fill
the scene. Imagine the milk, the carton and the glass in
their proper spatial relationships. Even if those are the
only identified objects, it will make a difference to the gist
if the space around the objects is empty or filled with this
‘visual stuff’. In this view, the gist of a scene would have,
as its foundation,  visual stuff spread out over some repre-
sentation of surfaces and objects in three-dimensional
space. Added to that base would be information about the
identity and relationships of a limited number of the
objects in the scene.
This definition of gist is only a proposal at this point.
There is, however, evidence that each of its components
are available in a brief look at a scene. Information about
basic features [23], the existence of surfaces [24] and
objects [25], and their three-dimensional disposition [26]
is all available ‘preattentively’. Add that material to the list
of objects passed by attention through the bottleneck to
memory, and you might just have the gist. Even if gist is
represented in this way, it will not be easy to explain how
a brain can remember thousands of gists in a picture recog-
nition experiment. Another program of research would be
needed to show that changes in the gist were necessary
and sufficient for efficient change detection. Given the
vitality of this area of research, it seems probable that we
will have a clearer picture of scene recognition in the next
few years.
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